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Robert Miller's varied and significant State Department career, which spanned 40 years 
of the Cold War (1951-91), is the directing force of his narrative. Vietnam and Beyond 
highlights both the continuity and the changes that defined the era's foreign policy in 
general and the author's personal odyssey in particular. Though Miller's work as an 
American Foreign Service officer led him to participate in the NATO buildup in the 
1950s, presidential travel and summitry, and the Congo crisis of the 1960s, his book is 
distinctly focused on the Vietnam War, which consumed his professional and personal 
life through much of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Miller was a moderate optimist on Vietnam when he became a political officer at the 
American embassy in that country in 1962. While he was skeptical of consistently 
positive evaluations of military progress, he was equally skeptical of those who argued 
that the United States was supporting a corrupt and inept government that was unable to 
capture the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. Miller was also convinced that 
most of South Vietnam did not desire communism, that Hanoi's aggression posed a 
significant threat to America's security, and that the failure to meet this challenge would 
damage America's global credibility. In the discussion of his time in Vietnam, Miller 
describes the complexity of American efforts to sustain the nation, the pressure that he 
and others were under to show the current administration's successes, and the increasing 
difficulties of achieving legitimacy and progress in the chaos initiated after the removal 
of President Diem in 1963. Each of these factors contributed to Miller's growing 
skepticism. 
After being injured in the 1965 terrorist attack on the American embassy in Saigon, 
Miller was transferred to Washington and became director of the State Department's 
Vietnam Working Group. His narrative emphasizes the changes that occurred as he 
became acquainted with a different war, "the bureaucratic war, the war of the media, the 
war of protest demonstrations, frustration, fatigue, and doubt." As the conflict in Vietnam 
grew increasingly destructive and progress stagnated, Miller's opinions began to diverge 
further from official US policies. He argued to his superiors in the State Department that 
American aid was negating South Vietnamese desire to take control of their own future, 
that South Vietnamese leaders ought to be pushed harder to broaden their domestic 
support base, and that US involvement in Vietnam now exceeded any possible national 
interest there. However, the American foreign policy elite continued to believe that de-
escalation would mean a defeat in the perceived battle against monolithic communism. 
Miller argues that it was the momentum of this Cold War thinking which both maintained 
and escalated the war. Indeed, the changing (and often increasingly negative) perceptions 
of those working on the lower rungs of the bureaucratic ladder were easily marginalized. 
"In fact, at my level we had no influence, no way of helping the ship of state to change 
course." Miller later served with the American delegation to the Paris peace talks, which 
he argues were frequently ineffectual and were drawn out for far too long while human 
costs increased. Since most of the published documents concerning decision- making 
processes on Vietnam are focused on the perspectives of the upper echelon of 
government, Miller's narrative is significant because it provides a window into the 
viewpoints and dilemmas of those charged with the State Department's daily operations. 
After the war, Miller held various posts within the State Department and served as an 
ambassador to several nations. Despite his intimate association with the American failure 
in Vietnam, Miller is at pains to emphasize the continuity of his (and America's) 
overarching goals and beliefs about foreign policy during the Cold War. Having begun 
his career in 1951 with the desire to help further the American objectives of rebuilding 
Europe and Japan, dissolving European colonial empires, and dismantling the Soviet 
empire, Miller could reflect upon his 1991 retirement that these goals had been 
satisfactorily achieved. 
By providing a first-hand account of the State Department's role in Vietnam, and by 
utilizing the recently declassified records (including his own) of middle ranking as well 
as senior officers, Miller's book provides an authoritative and enlightening insider's 
perspective on the operational dynamic, goals, and failures of America's Cold War 
foreign policy that will be valuable to scholars, diplomats, and interested laymen alike. 
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